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DEFINITION ATID DESCRIPTION.

A license is an authority to do a particular act
or series of acts upon another's lands,without possessing
any estate therein.

This is the definition generally ad-

opted,and is framed from the point of vier of the person
granting the authority.

A satisfactory description of the

effect of a license was given by ehief Justice Vaughan:
"A dispensation or license properly passeth no interest,
nor alters

or transfers property in anything,but only makes

an action lawful which without it had been unlawful."
Thomas v. Sarrell,Vaughan,35I.
The term has not always conveyed the same meaning.

It

was one of the old rules of law that a license could not be
pleaded unless

it appeared to be by deed.

word must have been equivalent to -of the old books,

There the

easment.

"license to alien" o-

In some

"license to give

livery of seizin" are not unconnon,whee the expression
is apparently synonymous with "power".
times

there has been confusion,"for

that

In more recent
is

often called

a license which is more than a license."
The distinction between an easment and a license is,
A

according to Ken

,often exceedingly subtle.

In Pierrepont

v. Barnard,6 N.Y.,279,it is said ihat an easment

is'

-2"A permanent, interest in the land for some specified period,
amounting to an estate in the land,which is assisnable,is
i~revocable and gives a right at all times to enter and
t
remain in possession during its c(ntinuance'"

While a

license "Is a me-e authority to enter upon the land of
another for a temporary purpose and to do a particular act
or series of acts upon the land,and gives no estate o,
interest in the land upon which the act or acts are to be
-L

done."

This is another way of saying that an easment is
A

an estate and a license is not an estate.
ion is
nor is

not feund in
it

The distinct-

the character of the acts to oe done,

contained in the temporary or permanent character

of the right which is

in

question,as one mi,5ht be le# 1 to

suppose from the above quotation.

But it lies in the

fact that the owner of an easxnent can maintain his rights,
while a licesensee,as a rulehas no ri4;hts to maintain.
The subteelty of the distinction,therefore,is that reqaired
to determine whethe- a ziven transaction ol- agreement shoald
be const-"ued

in

such a way as to create or c, nvey an estate

lands,or simply as a personal authority to do certain acts.
A lease

creates an estate in lands and entitles the

less ie to possession.

Bit between the rights of a tenant

strictly at will or at sufferance and those of a 1icenseo
as against the lessor in the one case and the lic&ensor

in

-3in

the other,the-e

is

practically

can claim any extension
him from whom he
act
is

n-

-1iiference.

of his privile(e

deriv=

or estate

his right,and

in

denoting an intention to terminate
sufficient

+o accomplish

first

that

and fourth sections

and interests
estate

in

case- any

existing

relations

of a license,

t

is

not within the Statute of' ilrauds,

i3

it

either

aw-inst

that r'-sLiit.

Such being the c aracteristics
evident

Neither

lands;

nor an interest

of

that

Statate

deal with estates

but L license passes
It

land.

in

by parol at any time unless there

The

neither an

may the-efore

be p)v'e'i

appears to be better

evi-

dence.

HOW CREATED.

According to the manner
naturally

in-o th-feciasses.

press agreement

want

,al formality

other effect;

and they maya

parties,o

agreement
lay

be

-

+he natture

of any kind.

fall

created by ex-

they ma,. result

from trans-

the intention ( r' the parties,because

of l

of the

origin,licenses

They may be

of' the parties;

actions w,thout regard to
a

of their

prevents
be
of

them from having any

implied f-om the relation
circumstances

without an

For conveniencethese

called expreaW,constructive

classes

and implied license.

-4-

EXPRESS LIC;:NSr.•

Express license results from agreement.
is

a pr'ivilege

o-

permi.ssion to go upon o-

In ef"fect

exercise

it

some

right over the land of the

-;rantor.

a close question as to the

intention of the parties,whether

it

was the purpose to grant such a

It

is

sometitnes.

privilege meely,or

an interest of a more permanent nature;

but if the inten-

tion was to grant a license,it may be done by parol,by writin.;
or'by deed,and all of

the

methods are equally valid.

In Prle vs. Case,IO Conn.,37!,the owner in fee of a
tract of' land orally gave pe-'mission to the father of the
plaintiff to e-ect a house on his land,and it was claimed
that this permission passed an interest of a permanent
nature.

But the C(urt replied:
tis license

just what

is given by parolit imports

-eyn unskilled wcld think it imported.

A

good understanding existing between these two men,
and the oner of the land bei-ng willing, to h-ve the
other fcr- a nei,3hbor,instead of giving him a deed of
land,which

wo.12d authorize him to

he might choose,says

introduce an-

one

ou may build you a place to

live in'

It

is

a personal

we have no hesitation in
when he who is

the

privilege

saying that

bjcct of it

-

it

-

-n

expires

d ies."

A written agreement between the parties by ,,which the
first

agreed. that

and wood on his

the seconJ, should have leave to cut timbfer

land,and the latter

h.uild have leave to

agreed that tne

i "'l r

flow his lands by a dam,was held to

confer licenseSupon the parties ,which though mutual to a
certain extent,in that cne ra

have been given in

consider-

Arts
ation for the otherl ,were yet independent ,so that onemiLght

revoke whet1nr the other revoked ur n,+.

Dodge vs.

Mc Clintock,,17 3T.Hf3836

A case often cited as an example of a license created
by deed ,

is Jackson v. Babcock,4 Johns.,I8.

privilege calied in the

Where a

instrument itself a "lease" was

given to the 1rantor of the defendant to build a house near
a mineral spring,and cultivate certain contiouous lands,and
the Jrantor of the "Lease" ccvenanted that-he. should not
be

distuvbed in his possession and enjoyment while it

was his pleasure to remain.

The court said that the instru-

ment was a mere license ,-a personal privilege to inhabit,terminating as soon as the liceseeO

sold the premises.

It

has been doubted whether such an instrument was technically

-6a license ,fMxxitxa-ppe,xsfor

or "licensee" had an interest
even as against

appears that the "Lesee"

it

in

or estate

the land

the grantor,at least beine; a tenant at will.

The grantor therefore rny have named the instrument more
accurately

that

the court.

A better example is that of the ]ast Jersey iron Co.
v. Wright,32 N.J. Eq.,248,where the agreement was that a
person and his representatives sh(,uld have exclusive riht
and privilege of raising and removing ores from certain
lands,tcgether with the privilege of enterfing into and
raising and removing

upon said lands for the purpose cf

ores,and of erecting such buildings and machinery as might
be necessary for carrying on the

mining business,andl pro-

-oyalty per ton (,n the ores removed,and for

vidin. for a

notice upon ceasing to exercise the privilege.
example

is

Shepherd v.

Another

McCalnont Oil Co.,3{ Hun.,37.

These cases make Aat once apparent why a license
granted with the greater solemnity

of a sealed instrument
It is

gives no greater -rights that one created by parol.
purely a question of interpretation.
that the

Whenever

it

is

found

intention of the parties was that a personal

privilege should pass and not an interest
instrument

is

in land,then the

called a license,and passes only such pri-

-7-

license.

vileges as are 6iven by any othe'

Being of equal validity,licenses granted by writing
or by deed may be varied by parol,at
be revocable.

Colcord v.

rteagely reported,seems
by writing subsequen
can be n, doubt

4

Cabr,

to be a

where

S.E.,6I7

they would

(ga.),thou.,h

case of a license

ly medified

by parol.

on this point ,for

a person could rev(ke
compulsion rests

least

it

granted

But there

would oc

strange

if

but could not modiify a permission.

upon the

other party to exercise

No

chan-ed

privilege.
The
or

intention of' the parties

absence

of consideration

added to the
altered

efficacy of a

by the fact

Weisman v.

inmaterial.

permission,nor

its

is

given

is

Nothinl
is

its

a

be

for con'sideration.

Jra-ted on condition.

Every

condition precedent ,or rather

to such agreements.

licensee may do certain acts
a XaKKX.&R

without

this

he

condition is

the acts for which he has

a

is
is

not
that the

being regarded as

fulfils
to

such

the doctrine

agreement

The

trespasser,provided

dition; whether
or after

is

nature

of conditions precedent and conditions subsequent
applicable

presence

Ducksinger,84 N.Y.,51.

A license may
condition

that

is

beinj found,the

a

certain con-

be performed before
license is

a matter

of

_-)
no consequence ,for

if'

he fails

is

forfeited.

V,,

"7hitney,15 Wend. ,80.

Freeman v.

-n either

case ,the

Healey,33 N.J..523.

protection
Mumford

C.ONSTRUCTIVE LICENSE.

"That

ne incorporeal

Says Alderson34,

in

inheritance

Wood v.

effecting lands,"

LeadlittlrI3

I.. 9 W.,838, "can

either be created or transferred otherwise than by deed,
is

a proposition so well established that

mere pedantry to cite authorities
such inheritances are said
and not

would be

in its support.

All

emphatically to lie in grant

in livery,and to pass by mere delivery of the

deed.

In all authorities and

a deed

it

is

text books on the subject,

always stated or assumed to be

indespenskbly

requisite."
On the other hand

the statute of frauds

declares

that

all leases,estates and interests,and all uncertain interests

in

lands,',ust

through ignorance
is undertaken to

be proved by writing.

If,therefore,

or mistake,an incorporeal hereditament
be created or conveyed withoutkdeed,or

any estate or interest in lands

is attempted to

be secured

by parol,it

either

transaction

fails

is

eveident

to accomplish

its

that

in

object.

case the

It does not follow that

the agreement

s

of no avail.

and by virtue of it

Any act

;cne under

must be with the consent of the owner

of the land,and exempts the other person from an action
of trespass.

An oral sale of anything that the Courts

construe as an interest in land is invalid.
comon example

is

the sale (f

does,however,give

trees.

a license to go upon the

the trees from the land.
is

standing

not incorporeal such

The most
Such a sale

land and sever

In all cases where the interest
transaction come

in conflict

only

with the statute of frauds,and are construed as licenses by
virtue of its operation.
poreal nature is
form in

in

But when an interest of an incor-

question,the courts have not been uni-

the reasons they assign for failing to give effect

to the intention of the parties.

Some basing their

decisions on the provisions of the statute of frauds,others
on the common law rule,that all incorporeal Ihriditaments
must be created by deed.
In Hewlins v.

Shippam,5 B. & C.,22I,where

a drain

constructed th-ough the lards of the defendant ,under an
oral permission given for a valuable consideration,was
obstructed by the defendants,it

was arguedl for the defern

dants that the permission was void under the statute;

i+

-10the
it

c( urt

,witho-t

deal inj

with tht

invalid by the cornuon law,as

heridatament
Stear-s,II

and did not rest

Mlass

,

533,on the

claimed under the

license was

e ns iderat ion, adjudged

it

in

was

an incorporeal

deed.

Cook v.

other hand,where

the right

equally incorporeal,was

based

wholly op the statute of frauds.
There

is

no

conflict between the

for courts must find that
interests

in

of the

incorporeal heriditaments are

is

to holP!

the statute

comion law are

In Wisconsin,there

was

invoked

in
if

The

statute.

regard,but

it

is

,;iven by parol a right

drawing logs for a single season.
the

of cases,

land,in order to bring them within the

The modern tendency
principles

two classes

the

necessary-

of way for

court held that ,if

transaction had been a lease,it would have been valid

under their statute;
subject

of a lease;

by the com-ein law be
Dtkinneen v.

but the ri-ht of way was not the
and,being

incorporeal,it

created for a

could nc't

single year

by parol.

Rich,22 Wis.,524.

The same result

is

brought about when there

is

an

attempted conveyance of real property,but where,through
some

defect,no title passes.

A vendee,in such a case,

who in ignorance of his lack of title,exercises autho-ity
over the land,cannot be regarded as a trespasser.

-ll-

In Little v. Willford,31 Minn.,
church had been erected on lanrJ

veyed

y

the plaintiff

tO

173;

17 II. .,282, a

supposed to have been

con-

trusteesfor the congregation,

but Nhich,throujh a defect of parties to the deed under the
Minn. statute,was not conveyed to them.
th at,while the

The

deed did not run to or purport

any right or interest to the parties
was erected,it was

court held

to convey

by whom the buil:ding

doubtless understood by all the parties,

including" the plaintiff,to

b.

an act authorizine

of the church upon the land as was done.

the erection

The plaintiff

meanwhile acquiescing with knowle'ge of the facts.

"That

an entry and imp-ovements made under such circumstances are
properly adjudged to be with the lic~bnse
land,

is

well settled."

It

of the owner of the

was also pointed out

.hat

the

fact that

the

deed does not make the transaction any the less a

license.

the parties are

igncrant of the effect of

Walt ,r v. Post,4 Abb. Pr.,389.

IMPLIED LICENSE.

Numerous instances
and thAS

occur where a license is

implied,

is a good defense to an action of trespass)ffrom

the relation o- conduct of the parties or fvorn circumstances
surrounding the case.

Men could not be social beings,

-

businels ceulP

it

a

5.

carried

it

'Hold be laivW'Al

C1st cn

another.

could rot
no
be

crn-' de

ava il-

nocessary t.o obtain pe)'! iFSicn i±r CvJ"i

'PO

b- a'orc

,erfencie4

c

' the c;tate

the aui.,vo:ity

rvit ,no,- coi!V

aL[,'i,.,'

nrit

I.)

n cossity

pes-,mptio'--,
r
that

p o te land of

,c

Y'.oined to r'x.ie

vc

-e-tain acts a-"e done with the land-

oqnrs ccnse n't
A classification has been made of th.;s kin: of license
intc

thcl-e

law.
all

irplied by the ownor anft those implied by the

Colcy
itiplie

on Trts,a2 RdW.,36.

licenses may be said to -o

dJstiLctic'n appea-os
'elation

t(,

In

implied by law.

on cf revocation.

Those

by the ow.er couzld Ic revoked by the owneriy the

sense

law are ,:-ocd with(ut regar,, to

implied

Those

iplied

the ac .&OzItate of

mini of hri on rho3e land they a-'e to ko ex cL11ed.
Of those implica

,y lu'

mnUy be

,crt(ned th.t of an

orf-ier of the >w to enter and serve
process;

1,.ta

and

private

_ndi-

:r .) use
Uk of adjcining" premi3es

lay 5e necessa_ry or c(;-v":nieriout

(,,'
ax-cute a valid

(f -h:, public autho-ties O

vic]uals to ente .

.ircase

of a fi.c breaking

in a city; to enter an,] .1-.atea n,'i.ance (,on p,-oper

(.cca 3)i

.

'-71 C1T"( 1-4

i .,('i t,-If

'i]-e

x!:a valid. one :rhen e'n d''ed with

t

the quest

,rnc

.

pc:-t office

f(,- rrnuil at

-'eason-

the disttiati(n point.cd (ut i-3 thr.

-I3-

real one,the implied

license to a proper perIon to enter
inplid .)y Lai.

an inn or a coach (A' a comn carrier i
by ihe oWner ae

f
Those i pLi-

on 'To 'tls , ITlass

,, iipli" ' d JY
....
L)Oh

;h_

-a-tn
Ini

%-to ten cl--330e,

i-

parts

(,ssC30ionof

lan-, has bun., i,,-f "y debts to anotheof

P.,lAt±on as to plac

z

cach class oy iLts original

a.;s iz,when th,

,

3jeoe lo.

thi,;e aiP. a,' mentioned

0,,iti

-iand desi

nr,3'-oas.

icen.ses

i'ios ;.eLc

'Vlhicj are well defineJ.

o "-

,

-ithoat any sti'Vrhn a party

..
mFoue'i tLh,

iyL possession u.±d s as tenant a piece of property of

an ontl% apon the land for thice pLL'pCse of ascertain in ;

ai.,

i7tcth er hi3 into
F_'

-,.!1-,tter to

In such a case the I'w all(,tJ

an(.t 'r.

'rhere

'-I,

'sts

-oozs have been sod wl!icli lie Jon
Sixth,

p.'operty cf the ,',dor.

(,ic

a- !

"".

a

.- , oL' anoth .r.

cdss

In

ters t'

which is

11- danr

1ses

such a case,the

T.

premi;es of anoth.of poishin,

r

-s act hvave
,oos,,vit7aj
Lt

maooJs
m..y enter and take them.

3rsren

possession

In such a case,the eoo-s

taker v.nd put upon the owner'-

Sevent). ,

upon thc

foryier's ) goods.

,ht

Wherr, LGe possessor

burd&nrld another with t

of lands has w"n,1tly

cf hi:

propcrly oy the possosso".

r'j,
e'ared

ai

tc

oner of the
:
,"'v

succor
en, .

J.

Lotten

.re a

is beast

Where an

-I4Aentry hasbeen made upon the
necessity,to

of another by reason of

lands

injury without the

escape some personal

fault

of the person entering.
addition to

In
Who

impliedly

and examine
r'lan,whose

those might be mentioned

invites

any one

or purchase his

office

the merchant,

to come upon his premises
Or the professional

ar-s .

the public may enter on business.

G owen

I

Wo & S.,II.

v.

Philadelphia Exchange

Co.,5

in

the habit of visiting

others may

So persons

assume

permission to go upon the premises for

that

that

they have
A per

purpose.

son coming to an unknown obstruction in a highway may go
upon the adjoining land to pass by the obstruction.
Campbell v. Race,

Under this head should

7 Cush.,408.

come the case of Teig's Appeal,62 Pa.
held that in

made by the city

Heaney,2 Denio,625,where

navijating public waters havean
fasten boats
Lakin v.

to a

Amos,IO

was

of war the government h.d an implied

when no objection is

Heaney v-

imply a

it

to build barracks and hospitals on the cormons

license
a city

time

gt.,29,where

dock such as

it

3

of

And

was said that persons

implied permission to

the one

in

question.

Cush,at page 220,held thai

license from a mother to a

the law will

son to open a vault

and

-15leave

there

exigencies

the corpse

of his brothor,from

of the case,the relation

the nature

anJQ

of the parties,and

the well established usage of a civilized and Christian
community.
Be

Where persons are

for a long tirr

mission of' the

,thay

are acting

owner.

that the water will encroach upon his
jurV may imply a

from which the

Johnson v. Lewis,

it would
out,if

license.

13 Conn.,303.

This enumeration of implied
The occassions

Neback ?r Rosendale

The presence of a person when another

is building a dam so
evidence

under the implied per-

Driscoll v.

,c. Co.,37 N.Y..637.

land is

accustomed to walk- or to

licenses

is

not exhaustive.

on which they arise are very frequent ,and

-ot be profitabld
indeed it

to attempt to point them all

would be possible to

do so,

EFFECT OF A LICENSE.

"By the
Why?

Because

a wall?

common law,every man's house
it

No!

It

throujh it,the
This doctrine

is

surrounded
may be

a

is

his castle.

by a moat o-.

defended by

straw hut;

v'AA, may entei- it,but
is

one of the most

English law,and by it
dominion of a proprietor,iS

the windi may Vqstle

the king can not."

firmly

founded of the

any intrusion,however
a trespass.

slight,oL
Yet men are

the
con-

-16-

tinuallyoin

upon others'

j

called upon"to make

that

land.

License

is

unceasingly

lawful which without. it

had bcen

unl awful" .
Whenever a
act,it

is

lawful
It

that act.
of servants
result

license

of

to

is

take the means

legalizes the

and excuses

4 he

g-Piven to do

act.

any

particular

necessary to perform

entry

of? a

sufficient

number

any injury which is the natural
Sterling v.

WNorden,

51 N.H.,217.

Selden v- Del & Hud. Canal Co.,29 N.Y.,634.
When a license

is

Jiven,the law imposes upon t-ie

licensor the duty of extra care

in case of danger.

A man

must not give permission to another to cross his

premises

on which he knows that

there are hidden pitfalls;,

without

giving notice of their

existence.

is

such a; to render

it

If

dangerous

the

license

is

injury.

express

It

use will
belief

or by implication.

in

as to produice a

not be objected
accordingly,he

and reasonable

makes no difference

of property has been accustomed to
use of it,such

whether

"If the owner

confident belief

that

the

to act on the

be held to exercise

view of the circumstancesso

pre-

allow others a permissive

to,and therefore

must

business

to those whom he permits

to use his land,he must use extra care
caution to prevent

a licensor's

his rijits

as not to mislead others

-17-

to their injury without a proper warnin'g
to recall the permission."
St.,269.
Houston

Driscoll

of his

Kay v. Penn. R.R.Co..65 Pa.

v. Newark ' Rosendlale Co.,37 N.Y.,E%7.

T.C.R.R.Co. v- Boozer,70 Tex. 5';0.

S.W.,II9.

intenticn

This duty,howOver,is

unusual danger,and when knoin to
known to the licensee.

S.C.

C

restricted to cases of
the licensor and not

Where the source of the danger

i7

not known to the licensor,or where it was not to be expected
from a prope- exercise of the license,no warning is required,
and no liability rests upon the licensoi',nor is he bound to
repair for the benefit of the licensee.
Fortesque,L.R.,II QB.D.,474.
And it

£, Q.B.D.,80.

Batchelor v.

Ivay v. Hedges,

L.R.

is to be presumedthat greater

care is requisite in case of a direct invitation to come upon
lands,thah when such use is merely permissive.
v.

Bost(n

c. R.R. Co.,

Wright

142 Mass.,296.

The licensee assumes to act with due diligence,
and negli.jently3

to dto nothing which would result injuroius-

ly to the propertySelden v. DO1.

Eaton v.

Winni

,20 I'iJch.,156.

& Hudson Canal Co.,2, N.Y.,634.

No prescriptive

n,, can be acqui-,e

under a linense.

A man's use- may be open and notorious,but it cannot be

-18adverse wlen it
another.
has

is

avowe, ly exercised by the permiss

Nor does

user may becore
N.J.
A
v.

length of tima

been enjoyed strengthen the

ton,63 N.H.,283.

I

the

But after

Eq.,I42.

which

claim..
the

adverse.

in

the use

Cox v. Levis-

revecation

of a license,

Vehter v- Raritan Water Co.,

Eckerson v.

Crippen,IIO N.Y.,585.

licensee cannot deny his licensor's title.

Glynn

George,20 N.H.,114..
Whe'e

improvements

license,they

are made (%n

do not beculne

the strength of a

part of tiie

re ,lty.

It

presumed that

there

nently attach

them to the realty,when the holding

rioug.

is

where

ki~k~zJkxJi

Barnes

Paul 1.

& 1.

R'y.

v.

the parties
buildings

that buildi-his

beceme fixtures.

to build,with the

is

so precai

the same princiThey remain

parnes,6 Vt.,388.
(Minn..

Co.,40 N.W.,528.

there are circumstances

is

intention to perma-

erected wrongfully on the land.

personal property.
St.

no

Such buildings do not come under

ple as thoe

v.

on of

to negative the

Ingals
But

intention of

remain personality,then

shall

such

Where a person had license

undertsanding

that

the

land should be

afterwrd conveyed to him,the structures were a part of the
real estate.

Ieland v.

Gosset,I7 Vt.,1o03.

-19ABUSE OF LICENSE.

Permissionto do an act implies that it
fully done.

is

to be law-

Such permission may be abused,and cannot

be extended to cover excesses of the privilege granted,
or misconduct in
ing this

the exercise

question an important

of the privilege.
distinction

is

In

consider

to be mde

be-

tween licenses implied end imposed by law,and those expressly
granted by the parties.
ed out in

This distinction was well point-

the Six Carpenter'

Case,and subsequent decisions

have not modified the Joct-ine,no -stated
"And

fii-st it

it

was resolved when entry,authority

given to any one

by law and he doth abuse

a trespasser ab initio; but where

it ,he

be punished fo-r

ab initio.
in

the case

adjudges

And

the reason for this

the pa;,ty gives

to do anything,he
which

is

cannot

done by his

shall

act quo animoe-,or

an authority

be

trespasser
is

that

of law,the
to what

law

intent

±iteriora secreta.
or license himself

for any subsequent

own authority

is

it,there he

difference

of general authority or licc,,se

he entered,for acta exteriora indicant
But when

or license

his abuse,but must not be a

by the subsequent

forcibly.

entry,authority or

license is given by the party and he abuses
must

more

or license."

cause,punish that
Six

-20-

Carpenters' Case,"' Co.,I46.

The reasoning

applies with equal force to all
It

is

not probable that

between licenses

cases of implied license.

the court had in mind a distinction

implied by law,and implied by the parties,

but they intended -1o Include both in
by law."

in the case

Jewell v.

the expression"given

"1-yhood,44 !\.H.,474.

It

is

an abuse

of a license to do any other act besides that for which
permission was given,or to refuse to do a lawful duty
imposed upon oneor to do the act in

a manner different frm

that imposed by law or by agreement of the parties.

Attack

v. Bramwell,3 Best & S.,590.

REVOCATI ON.

It

is

a common remark that licenses are

revocable.

If

in their nature

this truth had been constantly borne in

mind,a great deal of the conftmsion on this branch of the
subject would have been avoided.
ship frequently

Cases of apparent hard-

arising,and denial of relief seeming es-

pecially inequitable

in many cases;

the English Courts,being

and early decisions

either inaccurately or incomplete-

ly reported,or containing statements of
of

law broa).;,

°

in

eneral principles

than the facts of the case would warrant;

and the desire of the courts to break awaY from useless

-21technicalities qand~incorporate
into the law in some

instances;

to make the question of

the spirit of the

such c6ses have contributed

-evocation of parol license,so

far as authority goes,one of great uncertainty.

from the somewhat

2quity

Aside

technical rule that an incorporeal hern-

ditament cannot be created except by deed,there
hiLhl,,, important

are others

that licenses be held

reasons why it

is

revocable.

Parker C.J . ,in Cook v. Starnes said th

"If the defendant's plea (of license) were held to be a )ar,
all the mischiefs and uncertainties which the Legislature
intended to avoi.

(By the Statute of Frauds) would be

renewed; and purchasers of estates would be without means
of knowing

whether incumbrances exist or not on the land

which they purchase."

And in Wilkins VA Irwin,33 Ohio

St.,138.,it is said to be "The policy of the law that all
titles to land when effected by written instruments shall
appear upon the app opriate recordso that all may be infoy med who hold incumbrances ,their character,and where the
title reposes or is vested.
mode

of incumbrance to

But is this secret license

be maintained?

If scincum-

brances mi,:ht frequently be found to exist ,against which no
dilience couild
would cease to be

uard or vigilance protect.
-eliable guides.

Our records

To avoid[ all uncertaintll

-22to notify all
registry

wishing

information regarding land titles

laws were created,and their

foated

by claims

of the character

purpose
we

cannot

our
be de-

are considering."

Such considerations are a sufficient basis for
proposition that licenses are revocable.

In

the genera'l

'.he applicatio-i

of this principle,however,other interests are k'fected and
other principles become involved,

Modifications thus

brought about and those contended for by certain courts
will be considered c-s
FIRST,

exceptirns to the general rule.

When coupled with an interest.

That a

license coupled with an interest is irrevocable
puted law.

The

interest must be a valid oie legaly ob-

tained and the license
interest.

is undis-

If the

is regarded as incidental to the

license

in such a case is of a perma-

nent character,or is independent

of the interest,it so far

ceases to be coupled with an interest and loses thus
its exceptional character and
any other license,though not
from removing his property.
260.

Hazleton

far

may be revocked the same as
3o as to prohibit the ovner
Cooley on Torts 21n9i. Ed.,

v. Putnam,3 Wis. 307.

In this class

of cases,it is not that the license is irrevocable, but
a person cannot in this way nullify a contract,ot' dispossess
a neighbor of his goods which are without falt of the owner

-23-

upon such person's land.

Most of the authorities are cases

of the removal of property from another's land.
This principle was referred to by one or the judges
in 77ebb v. Paternoster,Palmer 71.

But the leading case

is Wood v.

it

Manly,If A & !;.,35,where

was held that tres-

pass would not lie for breaking op-i a gate and removing
a stack of hay which the defendan, I had previously bcught,
a license aiid remove the hay havin_

been given at the time

of the purchase,and assentcd to by the tenant when he took
possession,it being held that the license was irrevocable.
This principle has been applied, in a variety of circtQstances.
cases

In

of the oral

this connection shoild be mentioned the
sale of standing timber.

Such a sale,

though within the statute of Frauds by the wei~ait of authorityoperates as a license to sever

the trees from the

realty, when they at bnce become personal property and pass
tp the vendee*

He thereupon has a valid interest

trees,and cannot

be prohibited from- going upon the land and

temoving them within a reasonable tim-.

in the

The cases

are too numerous to mention,

Owen v. lewis 46 Ind,489,

Claflin v. Carpenter,4 Metc.

580,being good illustrative

cases.

Houses erected under a license which are per-

sonal property or other property upon land Ldnder like

cir-

-24cumstances

my be

revocation.

removeJ within a reasonable

Rogers v. Cox,96 Ind.,I57;

5 Wallace,5 9;

U.S.

Ingals

524; Cornish v.

40 N.W.

Mellor v.
chattel

Watkins,I.R.

on the land

and remeve

it

v.

9 ¢6.B.

DeHarro v.

Paul

Stubbs,Tsaw

Me Ry.
T'.&

Reports

400.

I C.P.334i

The sale

lawftu].

Randall,!

Or a conlitional

in

description are

accordance

SECVTD,

sale with leave

frequent,

to enter
Heath

and are

When executed.

It

is

often said in
is

always

but when executed it becomes irrevocable.

The truth in

cannot be revoked so as to maketacts

it before revocation unlawful.
to have
Palmer
rests

taken its
71.

is

rise

But the

in

the

the course

revocable,

statement has been .repeatedly pointed out,that

ecuted license

all

with the same principle.

of an opinion that a license executory

the

Buchannan,

Cush,I95.

Cases of this
decided

of the

Long v-

and retake poss4asion on failure of condition •
v.

Co.,

of the vendor with permission to enter

makes such entry

3 Gill & Jo II8;

St.

time after

an exdone under

This doctrine seems also
case

case on which

of Webb v-

Paternoster,

the modern doctrine

that of Winter v. Brockwell,8 East.,309.

Here

Lord EllenborouLoh

remarked that he tho :Jht

it

onable

a party had been

incur expense,

that after

-bed to

very unreas-

-25inconsequence

of ha-ring obtained a

do an act,anO

after

that the

the license

other shoul-1

and treat

the

very act.

first

license from 4nother to

had been acted upon,

oe permitted to recall

a

That he hId afterward looked into

Paternoster,where

license

license,

as a trespasser for having ,one

upon this point,and found himself justified
Webb v.

his

Hau~aton J.

that

the books

by the case of
lays

down the rule that

execut <I is not countermandable,but only when it

is executory.

, , And I-re

case was decided

in

the license was

1807.

executed.

This

In 1303 Lord Rllenborough

in Fentiman v- Smith 4 Fast.,II7,where the privilege
claimed was the right to maintain a tunnel across the land
of another as an appurtenance to a mill,had said that
allegations of the pleadings
without showing that

the

could not be sustained

the appurtenances were

legally

such;

and that the title to have the water flowing in the tunnel
over the defendant's
These

opinions

light

Helins

v.

be

distinguished,

Shippam,that

in

a deed.

land of thc plaintiff;

and it was pointed out

Winter v.

which was the object of a

on the land of the defendant,
the

pass .ithout

apparently zontradictoty,were enough to

cause the cases to
in

land could not

Brockwell the

license was
and was not

apparently

sk:-

erected wholly
a servitude

on

counting as of little

-26importance the

fact that

nailed to the plaintiff's

the framework

housb.

of the

sky-light was

Overlooking this in--

cident which did not fo-m a distinct question,the case is
the I adinj authority
license to io

for an important principle that a

someththg on one's own land which

interferes

with an easment of the licensor on the lands of the licensee
when executed,cannot be revked.
enforced and explained in
682.

This doctrine was further

the case Liggins v.

Here there had been a licnse

Inge,7 Bing.,

by the plaintiff's

father permitting the defendants to lower the banks of the
stream,anderect
plaintiff's

. weir,whereby

mill.

less water flowed to the

The Court pointed out that everything

had been done on defendant's own land and was lawful except
for the right of the plaintiff;
stream

ms

appropriated

publici. urs,

and since the water of the

and belonged to him who first

it,there was no reason why one

could not

relinquish the ri ;ht obtained by user,and thus enable any
other one to make

such use of it

had never attached.
limitations is

'Ihr

as if
true

hisprhor right
doctrine a-d its

well illustrated by the case of Icrse v-

Copeland,2 Grky 302.

in

this

case th'

owner of a

Jam licensed an adj(oinin. p-oprietor to build an embankment
to prevent the water from overflowing his landand also

-27to dig a ditch to diain the su-face water throu i the land
of the

owner

of the dam.

It

with the principle stated.,

was held

in

accordance

that th( license to build an,!

maintain the embankiment could not be revcked,butthat in
regard to tlhe ditch was revocable/
Anala-,ous to these are cases under statutes for the
flowering of lands by mill-dams.

There the right to flow is

derived

from statute,and the only question as between the

parties

is as to

lands.
that

It

the damages caused by tlie flowing of the

is said in Clement v- Durgin,5 Greeni,9.,

"These damages

parol.

the parity may waive o-' relinquish by

He thereby gives the

other party no new

or rib.t over his lands;

but he foregoes the right

ages which he might have

enforced by complaint

of a personal

action.

countermanded before

interest,
to dam-

in the nature

The license given might have been
it was acted upon;

as if a party promises

to give money no action lies upon it,but having given
he cannot recover it back.
he has given away."
adopts

He cannot reclaim what

Smith v. Goldinc,6 Cush.,I54,

the same view as to the nature

and decides that

no writing is

of the agreement,

necessary, )ut leaves unde-

cided the question of revocability in such a case.
Clement v. Durgir was

it,

soon limited to the

facts

there

Though

appearing by Seidenpa-ger vseems

SpeA -,I7 Ma j13,I23,there

to be no objection to the h(lding

in

'his

viev

of the

case .
A careful

survey of the line

to sh ws that they

of cases here

do not sustain the

doctrine

referred
contended

4

for.

There are

cases,however,which

squarely assert

broad proposition that

a license

executed

Notable among these

Taylor v.

Waters,7 Taunt,373,

where
ble

a Theatre

ticket

consideration

give an

is

for

and used for several

irrevocable

license to

remainder of the time.
Wood v.

twenty years

is

irrevocable.

given for a valuayeard was held to

enter the

theatre for the

This case was overruled by

Leadbitter,13 1 e W.,838 on the ground that

a right must

be created by deed.

followed and enforced by 1icRea v.
Scherpf,I Allen,I33.

Burton v.

frequently 'cited

in

suppo-t

the

The latter

such

c ,se was

11arsh,I2, Gr1y,2II,and
An early American

of the

irrevocability

case

of an

executed lic nae is Ricker v. Kelley,I Greenl.,1I7.
The

came up on demurrer and it

case

was held that an exe-

cuted license may be prov d by parol, a position never
disputed.

It

was also pointed out as a

distinguishing

feature that property placed on the land of another
under a

licrnse

remains the property of him who places

it

there ,and cannot
la.-!

of the
time

for

it

be removed

without notice of revocation and a reasonable

cases holJ

executed

is

the proposition that a

d rectly

irrevocable;

v.

in

license

usually other facts exercise

Th e

controlling influence.
frequently met with

any

Few if

owner.

removed by it3

to be

American

of Clement

b,, the owner

appropriated

-n"

the course

TDuroin aoove,even

a

broad proposition is
of opinions,as

in

such a state

in

the

case

as Massa-

chusetts where the policy of the Court has always been stron.Iy against the principle.
on this

decided directly
trine after

finding

Hampshire,in
and

in

in

Co.,II2 Ill.,384;
Lay be
that

principle.

of Houston v-

and in

is

It

maintained

that are no longcr

on principle.

When 6,iven on consideration o-

and acted on at

New

Wiggins Ferry

the doctrine

they are founded on preceIents

great expense.

in

'he doe

Maine as be fore mentioned.

followed and are untenable

executed at

Then a parol license has been obtained
considerable

many cases that the license
lithout

some states,

Laffee,46 N.IT.507,

National Stcck Yards v-

said of other cases Vhere

,THIRD,

In

favor has been repudiated,as

the case

Illinois

But probabIy n6 case has been

paying all

expenses

expense,it
cannot be

is

the doctrine

revoked at

that have been

least

incurred-

of

-30Suits

in law have been brou.Jht and the courts have denied

relief,saying Vthat

if the plai ntiff had any remeciy,it

.vas in qquity, Foster v. Brownirj

,

R.I. 4.7.

The G-cund

on which it was supposed that equity would interfere is
virtual fraud,or estoppel,and the court would1 be asked to
Jecree an injunction or speci;'ic performance.

It is said

that the licensors conduct is a 1irect encourajement to
spend money and his revocation, if permitted,would amount to
a fraud.
This particular -octrine has not received much sanction fram English C~urts.
that

it

was first

In the United States,it seems

accepted in

LeFevre,4 S.':.R.,20I.

the

case of LeFevre v-

Rerick v- Kern,14,$.& R.

followed,and formulated the doctrine that

7

"a ri-Jht

under a license,hen not special/y restricted, is comtmlensurate .,,ith the thing for which the license is

;ranted-"

This principle has ben adhered to in sLibsequent Pef.iisylvania decisions,17cKellip v. McIlhenny,4 W'atts,6I7,logically holding" that a license bipeds a purchaser from a
licensor, and passes to an assi6-nee of the licensee;thoujh
in Huff v. TMcCauley ,53 Pa. Stale,,306,thle Court
Doctrine

of Relick v. Kern is

said that the

beyon4li. the cornen l w

and

the equity, practice of other states,and limits its appli

-31
cability to cases where money hqgs been expended or where the
parties cannot be placed in
I.

Indiana,Campbell vDecorah &'c. Co.
v.

Ind.

is

A tO;

law in

the
In

Iowa

Iowa,4.90 and in Ohio Wilson

Rep.,2,1C:,unless the case of Wilkins v-

0hi

Chalfaut,I

: V.R.R.Co.,IIC

Greer,'.,

v.

This

statu auo.

in

Irvin,33 Ohi(l St.,I38,throws doubt on the subject

that

INeb)-aska and Nevada are said to maintain the

state.

case of' Clark v. Glidden,

same principle,and the recent

15 Atlantic ,385,in Vermont must proceed on that ground.
have Given more or less sanction to the

Other stltes

principle,but in

Illinois,New Hampshire

and Maine

it

has

been expressly repudiated after finding some recojniticn.
Withotit test in.j the question by taking up in
the elemnts

of estoppel,the

fact that there

title

knowledSe
is

silence
expenses

in
of

licensee knows that

the facts-.e

of all

is no deception

Both parties have

seems to be decisive of the question.
full

the one jo'antinj -the permission.

The

the licensor while the other party is

does not worl

detail

an estoppel,for

if

making

he shoald break

the silence.he could only remind the other that title
in himself and that
at his pieasure;
sLn-d to know.

the lisense

and this the
If

it

is

is

subject to revocati(n

other

is

conclusively pre-

be urged that were estoppel

applied,the

g-'antee mioat as well be presumed to

a 1 cense accompanied
ble,it

may be

license

is

replied that all

always

of the principle
hasten to make
a

revocable;

on his part

agree that
-,nd it

in

order to

irrevoca-

a mere naked

would be a perversicen

of estoprel to hold that

expense

is

that

a person rnav

estop the revocation of

license .
It

is

to

to expense

be presumed,therefore5 that when a person goes

on the strength of a

on the good will
of its

of the

exercise

and expectation
he

so relying

a

benefit

a revocation. 1f his real

otherwiseit

Woodward v.

22 N.E.,73
Co.

is

license,he does

licensor or on the mutual

to prevent

should have acquirel

one.

•

by expense

knowr

is

without

legal riL-ht

Seeiy,II

if

foundation,for

he wishes

Ill.157;Hodgkins v-

(Wass.); and National

Stock v.

intent

to enjoy

Farriggton,

Wiggins Ferry

112 Ill,384.
The

taken that a person cannot
repay expenses wherever

ginally granted

revoke

,,iithout offering to

the ex enses are

license.

execution of the

involved.

the position often

same consideration ang9tye

But where

incurred

the license

for consideration,other

in

the

was

ori-

principles are

Such agreements are n(t against the policy of

thelaw,Freemn v.

Headly,33 N. J.Law,b23.

If

the license

-33

is

rev(ked before

its

exercise

is

be6",an,there

is

why the consideration may nct be recovered.
if

it

is

no reason

In any case

possible to determine what part of the considera-

tion should be returned, there seems to be no reason why it
should not be recovered on the 6round of partial
consideration.

Smart

v.

refer-ed to as an example
breach of contract

Jones,I5 O.B.

fail.U-e of

N.S.,717 is

of a recovery allowed for a

brought about by the revocation of a

license which had been 6-ranted for consideration.
Gray's Cases on Property,363 and Note.
allowed not only fo-

2

Damages were

the ccinsideration advanced but for

1-tospective profits on the transaction.

It

will be found

that the revocation of the license did not have any effect
upon this decision.

It

was a sale of an interest in land

within the fourth section of the statute

of' F-auds,and

a written memorandum of the contract was made.
was therefore
a breach of it

There

a valid contract which could be proved,and
gave a riffht of action for damages

the same

as a breach of any other contract.
Cases of active
interfere.

frau-! may arise when equity should

And when the circutmstances are the samne as

those where specificm performance
the sale

of land is

of a parol contract for

decreed,equity will decree

specific

-34-

performance
of

the requisite

statute
the

of what

in

its

inception was a license.

elements

to take

must be present.

a parol sale

There must

All

out of the

be an intention on

one side to crant and on the other to obtain a right,

anestate,and

the t-ansaction must be followe, by acts

referable

solely to the supposed contract.

ciple was

recognized and wellillustratedin

This printhe cases of

Wolf v. Frost,4 Sand. Chanch.,72,Hazleton v. Putnam,3
Wis,117 and Johnson v.
casesequity refsed
action of the

Skillman,29 Minn,27;

to interfere,,in

the first

in

also because

there was an adequate remedy at

The

the last

statutes.

conditions

for both of

the weight

because

the

the

those

reasons

and

law adnder

In Cook v- Priden,40 Ga.,53I,the

specific performance

for specific performance

result

of which

second because the agreement was too in-

definite,and

court decreed

all

licensee was not referable solely to

agroement,in the

the Minn.

in

of this

study is

of authority,licenses

on the
were

that

-,round that

the

fulfilled.

on principle

and by

are revorableunless thev

&r-

&ye

coupled with an interest)r

^in the nature

ment

or personal

of a negative

circumstances
per folmance.

are

easment
such

as to justify

a

of a relinquish-

right,or
decree

the
for specific

WHAT REVO1K S?
A license may of course be expressly revoked.
act which renders any authority inoperative
in the case of a license.

An

s sufl'icient

A transfer of the property

over which it is to be exercised or the death of' either
party operates as a revocation.

The same result occurs

when there is a subsequent Lrant of a privilege to another
person inconsistent with the exercise of a license formerly
given.
in

Eckerson

v. Crippen,IIO N.Y. 58.

its natu 'e a license

clear that

an attemptei

operate as a

revocation.

to revoee is sufficient.
Lockhart v. Gier,5A
for

damages,and

it

Being personall

rzannot be assigned;
assignment

would in

but it
all

An act indicating an

is

not

cases
intention

This was held to be the case

Wis.,133 on the commencement

in

of a suit

was held that damages might be recovered

from the time of beginning thq action.
cited elsewhere are also authorities
%vhatamounts to a revocation.

aany of the cases

on the question of

-36TAB

Attack v.

iFE

OF

C I TA TI

Bramwell

ONS.

20

Barnes v. Barnes,

18

Batcheler v.

17

Fortesque,

Bigelow on Torts,

13

Burton v.

28

Campbell

Scherf
v.

I.

& V.

R.R.Co.

31

Campbell v. Race,

I4

Cla.f'flin v.

23

Clark v.

Carpenter,

Glidden

31

Clement v. Durgin,
Colcord v.

27

Carr

7

v. Priden

34

Cook v. Stearns

10, 21

Cooley on Torts

12, 22

Cook

Cornish v. Stubbs

24

Cox v. Lewiston,

18

Decorah P-c.

31

Dellaro v.
Dodge v.

Co. v. Greer,

United States,

24

MIcClintock

Driscoll v.

ilwark ,° Rosendale

Dwinnen v. Rich
Fast Jersey Iron Co. v. '7right

5
Co

15, 17
I0
6

-37-

Faton v.

vi

Winne

Eckerson v.

Crippen,

JFentiman v.

Smiti,

"oster

v.

10,

25

Browning,

Freeman v. Headley,

L

14

Exchan;e Co.,

Gowen v- Phila.

6ase on Property

Hazleton v-

32
18

Glynn v. Ueorge,

Gray's

35

33
22,

Putnam,

34

Heany v.

Heaney-

14

Heath v.

Randall

24

Hewlins

v.

Hodjkins v.

9,

Shippam

32

Farrindton,

Houston & T.C.Ry.

25

17

Co. v. Boozer

Lafee

29

Huff v. McCanley

30

Hosston v.

Ivay v.

Ingalls v.
Jackson

17

1ledges,

St.

Paul Ii.M.RFy.Co.

20

Jewel v. Mahood

Johnson
Kay v.

15

Lewis

34

v. Skillman
Pennsylvania

24
b

v. Babcock

Johnson v.

18,

Ry.

Co.

17

-38-

Kent's Commentaries,

14

Le Fevre v. lie Fevre

30

Lak in

14

v.

Amos

Leland v. Gassett

18

Little v.

II

Willfors,

Lockhart v. Gier

35
24

Buchannan

Lone v.

McKellip v.
McRea v.

McIlheny

30

Marsh

28
I4

Meigs Appeal

Mellor v.

Watkins

24

Morse v.

Copeland

26

M-unford v- Whitney
Stock Yards v.

Natiorl

8

Miggins
29, 32

Ferry Co.,
Owens

v. Lewis

23
I

Barnard

Pierrpont

v.

Prince v.

Case

4

Rerick

v.

Kern

30

Rizker

v. Kelley,

26

Rogers

v.

24

Cox

Seidenspar.er
Selden

v.

v-

Spear

T)el 1 Hudson Canal

28
Co

I6

--39-

Shepperd v. McCalmont Oil
Six Carpenters'

6

Co.

Case

19

Smart v. Jones

33

Smith v.

Golding

27

Stirling

v..

16

Warden

Taylor v. Waters
I

Thomas v- Sonell
Vehte v. Raritan Water Co.

18

Walter v.

II

Webb

v.

Post
Paternoste-r

23, 24

Weisman v. Lucksinger

7

Wilkins v. Irvin

2i,

31

Wilson v.

Chalfant,

31

Winter

Rockwell

24

v.

Wolf v. Frost

34

Wood v. Leadbitter
Wood v.

6,

Manley

!Xoodward v.
Wright v.

23

Seeley

3oston &c.

28

32
R.R.

CO.

17

